

BEGIN, Menachem

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V. 11 May 78

- ISRAEL

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BEGIN SPEAKS TO NATION ON ANNIVERSARY OF INDEPENDENCE

TA102008Y Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1803 GMT 10 May 78 TA

[Address to nation on 30th anniversary of nation by Prime Minister Menachem Begin]

[Text] On the eve of independence day, I turn to you, the citizens of Israel, with basic and principle words. In the 30 years since we freed ourselves from foreign domination and renewed our independence in Eretz Yisra'el, our people have accomplished things about which each and every one of us is filled with citizens' pride. We are five times as numerous as when we established out state. Those returning to Zion have come to us from dozens of countries and became one nation renewing its youth. We have kept our state an open house for every Jew who has been persecuted or who feels degraded in exile or decides to return to the homeland in order to live here as a free man. We have kept the character of the State of Israel as a free state, built on democratic foundations, while all around us are dictatorships and tyrants.

The building was wonderful, in town and country, in agriculture and industry. The educational system is Israel's pride. The health services have been broadened. Our country is beautiful, green. Our land, with its developed sources of water, is fruitful. The land is good, very good. How few we were at the beginning of our road; how poor were our weapons, with which we withstood the heavy campaign against those who rose up against us. Today an enormous force stands at the disposal of the nation. It is indeed true that not since the days of the Maccabees have the people of Israel been so rooted in their country as they are today. There is reason to give thanks; there is much to be grateful for.

But we look toward the future and to it, to our future, we will give our concern. We must continue to maintain our state as an open house for every Jew, as a free land, a land of immigration and settlement, as a center of renewed Hebrew culture, as a center of the Torah of Israel, as one of the world centers of developed science. We must do away with poverty and misery among families with many children and give every citizen an honest chance to advance in life. There are still many obstacles and difficulties before us. But if we remember what we have overcome on the road up to now, we will have faith that we will advance in the future in all spheres of national and governmental creativity.

Peace--it is still not given to us, although we are making and will continue to make every effort to achieve it. We must say clearly that it is our duty to guarantee to our people and future generations genuine peace, and not put them, heaven forbid, in danger of constant blows from those who wish us harm. This is the combination which cannot be separated, between our right to Eretz Yisra'el and the national security needs. The great campaign these days is over this. Do not despair. The difficulties did not begin yesterday or the day before yesterday. We must stand firm in the belief in our justice. We will overcome these difficulties and we will, with the help of the Lord, gain the genuine peace that all of us hope for. We will continue to make every possible effort to obtain this national objective and fulfill the other national and governmental targets--political, social and economic--facing us in the 31st year since the birth of Israel. Happy independence day to the entire house of Israel.

DAYAN INTERVIEWED ON MIDDLE EAST SITUATION

TA101544Y Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 10 May 78 pp 1, 4 TA

[Interview with Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan, by Ilan Kefir, YEDI'OT AHARONOT correspondent in London--date not specified]

[Excerpt] "On the occasion of Israel's 30th year since independence, I anticipate a political breakthrough in the Middle East conflict. [paragraph continues]

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I hope that the negotiations with Egypt continue and even extend to include the Palestinian issue." This was stated by Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan in a special interview to YEDI'OT AHARONOT on the occasion of the 30th independence day.

Discussing what could be expected in the 31st year of the state and beyond, the foreign minister said: "I hope that this year we will be able to reach negotiations with the Egyptians and maybe also with Jordan and the Palestinians on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip about the territorial future of these areas, about the problems of the Arab refugees and about the relations between us, the Israelis, and the residents of the Arab territories."

To my regret, he continued, and despite the chances for a settlement with Egypt, I cannot foresee in the coming months and years a settlement and complete calm with the rejectionist countries led by Syria and Iraq. These countries reject the very existence of the State of Israel and I do not foresee any chance of reaching a settlement with them in the near future. At the most we may reach a settlement with Egypt and Jordan despite the expected difficulties.

As regards defense, political and economic issues, I expect there will be certain stability in the coming years thanks mainly to the great support of the world Jewry and U.S. friendship.

On what does the foreign minister base his optimism concerning the chance for resuming the negotiations with Egypt?

Dayan: "I think it is possible that our plan to discuss deeds and not principles will be accepted by the Egyptians. I do not think that the United States would have raised this subject in the talks we had at the State Department had there been no desire for this in Egypt.

"I do not think we should change anything in our initiative, in our peace plan. In my opinion, it is good and comprehensive, if negotiations indeed start and the other parties, both the Egyptians and the United States suggest changes, we will have to discuss them. Our plan is not an ultimatum. I do not think we should introduce changes in our plan at our own initiative."

Question: How do you see the future of the West Bank at the end of the 5-year period of the autonomy plan?

Answer: This is one of the important issues the cabinet will have to discuss in the future. I would not want to discuss this subject at this early stage.

Question: Does the very readiness to discuss the future of the West Bank with the Egyptians as one of the first and major issues constitute, in your opinion, a mine that may blow up the talks in the future?

Answer: It would have been easier to discuss with each state and with each leadership the subject directly connected with it. With As-Sadat we should have discussed the Sinai and the Gaza Strip refugees. With Husayn and local Palestinian representatives we should have discussed the future of the West Bank and the refugees. If it is possible to promote the negotiations by discussing with Egypt questions pertaining to the West Bank, we will do so.

Question: Does it seem likely to you that Egypt will be ready to undertake the representation of the Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip without having Husayn and their direct representatives join the talks?

Answer: I do not yet know if Egypt will be ready to undertake this. The question is whether Egypt will be able to find parties authorized to speak for the Palestinians with whom we will be able to have a thorough discussion aimed at solving the problems.

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Question: Will you view an Egyptian agreement or conclusion regarding the Palestinian issue as a commitment of the residents of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip?

Answer: It is too early to say, it all depends on who is speaking, what they say and their authority to speak. In principle one can say that the Egyptians have no less authority to discuss the issue of the Gaza Strip than Jordan has to discuss the West Bank.

Question: In case of a deadlock in the negotiations and in view of the fear of local Palestinian elements to conduct negotiations with Israel, will you be prepared to consider a dialog with the PLO if it cancels the clause in the Palestinian Charter on the annihilation of Israel?

Answer: No, absolutely not. I will not agree to meet with 'Arafat and with members of this murderers' organization. None of us views them as partners for negotiations.

Will Jerusalem be a subject for negotiations?

According to Dayan, united Jerusalem has been and will remain the capital of Israel and there is no question about this. The question of the holy places and the Arab towns around the capital will be subjects for negotiations. The towns of Ramallah and Bethlehem and the villages of ('Izarya) and (Shu'afat) are today an inseparable part of Jerusalem. It seems to me that the residents of these towns are not interested in being cut off from Jerusalem and are interested in continuing the common framework of life with the Jewish population.

I cannot go into detail regarding the holy places but the tendency is to grant freedom of action to all faiths. This is one of the subjects on which the government will have to decide.

Does Dayan not fear that a political deadlock may undermine the As-Sadat initiative?

He answers: "If there is no continuation for this initiative for a long while and the negotiations are not resumed, the initiative will remain lifeless. Lifeless negotiations will die. It will be very regrettable if As-Sadat's brave initiative remains an episode which came and went without any results.

"It will be regrettable if this happens. We will do everything in order to keep the negotiations alive."

Is the foreign minister concerned about the demonstrations of the Peace Now Movement and the rise in its activities?

It is hard for me to understand this phenomenon, Moshe Dayan says. I would like the demonstrators to come and tell us what else they expect of us. I would like to ask them what else we should do in the Sinai in order to meet and further Egypt's demands. We have proposed to As-Sadat sovereignty over the entire Sinai, something nobody expected us to do at such an early stage. There were quite a few who criticized us for this farreaching step.

As for the West Bank, we have a plan that seems to me a good basis for negotiations. Yet nobody is prepared to discuss this with us. What we want is peace.

In a look backward, how would the foreign minister sum the 30 years of Israel's independence?

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"I think we can look back with satisfaction at the past 30 years. Not all of our dreams were realized but for the first time Jews are living in their land and enjoying liberty and political independence.

"This was the objective of the country when it was established. For long years we did not have the right to enter, emigrate to and settle in the country. We could not pray at the Western Wall. Today everything is different. Jerusalem is no longer a city with a wall dividing it and the Western Wall is liberated.

"We have many problems that cannot be ignored but we are independent in a Jewish state."

DAYAN DISCUSSES INTERVIEW HE GAVE TO SWEDISH TV

TA102055Y Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 2010 GMT 10 May 78 TA

[Israeli TV correspondent Mikha'el Karpin interview with Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan in Oslo--recorded, via satellite from Oslo]

[Text] [Dayan in midsentence] ...why we did not respond properly to As-Sadat and I had to explain how much we gave to As-Sadat, more than he or anyone had expected. Today what is holding up the negotiations with Egypt is not that Egypt is not pleased with what it has received from Israel, but that it has no other Arab partners and not what Israel was prepared to give it.

[Question] Mr Dayan, you were quoted yesterday by Swedish Television as having said that a new war is to be expected because of As-Sadat's isolation. Did you say this?

[Answer] I did not say that and I want to tell you that journalists can sometimes drive you crazy, without meaning to insult you. They take, just for sensation, a sentence from here, a sentence from there, just to make a sensational headline. I was asked, and I said that if in the end, nothing comes of the negotiations for peace, there is certainly a possibility that there will be another war initiated by the Arabs; but not as any sort of topical thing or something expected in the near future.

DAYAN: RETALIATION POSSIBLE IF TERRORISTS STRIKE AGAIN

TA110608Y Jerusalem Domestic Service in English 0500 GMT 11 May 78 TA

[Text] Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan does not rule out new Israeli retaliation in south Lebanon if terrorist attacks against Israel are carried out under a UN umbrella. He told newsmen in Oslo that he hoped UNIFIL would not allow the PLO to carry out such actions.

Israel was handing over the area to UN forces on the assumption that the PLO terrorists would be barred from the region.

He did not think that Israeli troops would fight UN forces in south Lebanon if they failed in their mission.

Asked whether the Soviet Union could play an active role in Middle East peace efforts, Dayan said the Soviet Union was siding with the rejectionist Arab states and was not encouraging the Arabs to participate in President as-Sadat's peace initiative.

NEW CHIEF OF STAFF BRIEFS KNESSET COMMITTEE

TA101210Y Tel Aviv HA'AREZ in Hebrew 10 May 78 p 1 TA

[Text] The question of whether a change is taking place in the deployment of UN forces in southern Lebanon, especially in the Tyre region, will become clear in the coming days, Chief of Staff Lt Gen Refa'el Eytan said yesterday in a review of the situation in southern Lebanon.

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In the review, given to the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Security Committee, the chief of staff said that for the time being the situation in southern Lebanon is stable and there are no signs of a return of armed terrorists to the region. Nevertheless we should wait and see how things develop. The chief of staff said that the coordination between IDF units and the UN forces is satisfactory.

Further on Remarks

TA101211Y Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 10 May 78 p 5 TA

[By Yehoshu'a Bizur]

[Excerpts] Ultimately we will get out of southern Lebanon, Chief of Staff Refa'el Eytan told a meeting of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Security Committee yesterday. However, he neither named a date nor defined the period during which the IDF would maintain its positions beyond the border.

The appearance of the chief of staff before the committee was marked by the conciseness and brevity of his remarks, a characteristic that has already become his trademark. The briefing by the new chief of staff lasted only 20 minutes, and afterward he answered, most briefly, questions by the committee members.

The chief of staff explained that he is going to meet with the supreme commander of the UN forces in our region, General Siilasvuo, in order to coordinate with him the continued cooperation between the IDF and the UN forces stationed in southern Lebanon. According to Lt Gen Refa'el Eytan, the cooperation with the UN forces is good and there is continuous contact between the different levels of command in the area. According to the chief of staff, there are repeated terrorist attempts to penetrate into the regions already evacuated in southern Lebanon. In some cases, the UN forces manage to take control over the situation and to prevent these penetration attempts, while in others the problems created are yet unsolved.

The Foreign Affairs and Security Committee heard from the chief of staff the opinion that it is inevitable that the IDF will remain in the border region in southern Lebanon until the UN forces complete their full deployment in the area and the additional 2,000 soldiers, promised by the UN secretary general, arrive. We need a clear feeling that the UN soldiers can prevent the penetration of terrorists into the south.

CHIEF OF STAFF: JUDAEA, SAMARIA VITAL TO ISRAEL

TA102037Y Jerusalem Domestic Television Service in Hebrew 2010 GMT 10 May 78 TA

[Text] Chief of Staff Lt Gen Refa'el Eytan says the IDF will not be able to guarantee the existence of the State of Israel as an independent state without Judaea and Samaria and the Golan Heights. As for Sinai, this is dependent on the nature of the agreements with Egypt when they are achieved. Lieutenant General Eytan made these remarks to our military correspondent 'Amiram Nir in a special interview for independence day that will be broadcast tomorrow evening. The chief of staff also said that he thinks the basic intention of the Arabs has remained to remove the State of Israel even though certain countries in the Arab world have recently decided to obtain this objective through means other than war.

HA'AREZ COMMENTS ON TASKS FACING WEIZMAN

TA101255Y Tel Aviv HA'AREZ in Hebrew 10 May 78 p 13 TA

[Ze'ev Schiff commentary]

[Excerpts] Two major issues concerned 'Ezer Weizman immediately upon assuming office of defense minister: the defense budget and discipline in the IDF. [paragraph continues]

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He did what was not done by any defense minister preceding him, except for Ben-Gurion, when he decided on a significant cut in the defense budget and even used the method of making cuts in advance--without clarifying details. He left the IDF to manage on its own with the remaining sum. The IDF and especially the chief of staff were shocked by the method and by the cuts. "Ezer Weizman was not deterred by the criticism and also agreed to cut the 1978 budget, albeit in a different way.

I have talked with him several times on this issue and he always emphasizes: "I want us to have a lean and muscular army rather than one which is too fat and replete. After 4 years of receiving abundant equipment, and the taps were wide open, it is not bad for the IDF to introduce reforms. In any budgetary cut, despite the difficulty, there is also something positive."

There is undoubtedly a great deal of truth in what Weizman says. The positive is clear, but it is worth saying something about the difficulty caused in Weizman's first year as minister of defense. 1978 will be the first year when the strengthening clause will decrease to 50 percent of the budget. The amount allocated for this strengthening was always higher and this enabled us to build up our military strength at such a fast pace, confronted by all the Arab armies. True, with the broadening of the army, that section of the budget which finances current expenditures also grew, but in addition to this there are several economic and budgetary phenomena that will affect the growth of both the qualitative and quantitative strengthening of the IDF.

Because of galloping inflation in Israel (according to the Defense Ministry, inflation will amount to 47 percent this year) and the ever increasing price of the arms systems, the real value of both the dollar and the Israeli pound in the defense budget is decreasing. In 1978 there will be an actual decline of about 6 percent in the quantity of Israeli pounds at the disposal of the defense establishment. It is a mistake to think that this will only affect the building of offices, receptions, construction and so on. This will necessarily affect more vital spheres, such as training or orders for arms systems produced locally.

The best example of this is the order for Kfir aircraft for the air force. In 1977 the number of orders for these aircraft was decreased, and in 1978 the decrease will be more drastic. As for the dollar, the decrease will be greater. Next year the defense establishment will receive \$1.1 billion instead of \$1.4 billion for procurement from the United States, and in floating dollars (those to be spent outside the United States in cash)--\$194 million instead of \$300 million.

In the sphere of disciplinary matters too, Weizman entered office with impetus. He discussed this with the senior commanders and imposed several measures, but things did not move as fast as he wanted at the beginning. Within several months after assuming office Weizman was thrown into the turmoil of the political negotiations with Egypt. The impression of many is that it was not so much Begin and Dayan who wanted Weizman as a full partner in these negotiations, but rather As-Sadat, who indirectly dictated the reality.

Weizman linked the delay in treating the question of discipline and other organizational matters with the change of the chief of staff. He decided to wait until he appointed the new chief of staff. At first the intention was to replace Gur in January this year, but finally his term of service was extended until April. In any case, according to some of Weizman's confidants, Weizman did not comply with Gur's request to have his term extended by another year.

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Refa'el Eytan is Weizman's chief of staff--his appointee. His predecessor, Shim'on Peres, did not have this right, that is, unlike Dayan, about whom it was said when something went wrong in the IDF that it was because the chief of staff had been imposed on him and was not his choice. The Weizman-Eytan duo will now march together for better or for worse.

Eytan has begun to act in the field where Weizman wanted to initiate actions--the field of discipline. It may be assumed that in the near future he will also act in the sphere of IDF organization. This is a subject which Weizman had instructed Major General (Res) Tal to investigate. But the discussion of Tal's report was postponed because of the firm objection of the previous chief of staff.

Reorganization will institutionalize the minister's supervision over the IDF and the entire system, since reorganization will certainly lead to the establishment of a well organized headquarters at the minister's side. With the appointment of Eytan as chief of staff, it is reasonable to assume that many decisions that met with Gur's opposition will go through without any difficulty. Mordekhay Gur delayed for months the decision that the defense establishment controller would also check the level of readiness in the IDF. This led to disagreement between Deputy Defense Minister Zippori and Gur, and the defense minister finally decided in favor of his deputy.

Apparently, such clashes will not take place during Eytan's term as chief of staff. This is not the main point for the required reorganizing. A parallel headquarters by the side of the minister is needed in order to prevent total dependency on the system that led to the use of the cluster bombs in Lebanon in contradiction of the commitment made to Washington. It is only a pity the reorganization did not happen last year. A period of relative calm would have facilitated the reorganization. However, one way or the other, this will certainly be one of Weizman's most important tests as defense minister during his second year in office.

COST OF LITANI OPERATION REPORTED

TA101237Y Tel Aviv HA'AREZ in Hebrew 10 May 78 p 1 TA

[Text] Direct expenditure on the Litani Operation has amounted to over .5 billion Israeli pounds to date.

The calculation of the cost was recently made by the defense system economists. The sum in question is only for direct costs and does not include indirect costs that would have raised the figure.

Despite the large outlay it was decided in the Defense Ministry not to submit a request for additional funds at this time.

The unexpected expenditure will make things difficult for the IDF in its various activities. Defense system economists say that ultimately, especially in view of inflation, which will be greater than that estimated by the Finance Ministry, the Defense Ministry will have no choice but to submit a supplementary budget in the second half of the fiscal year.

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The Egyptian and Israeli ambassadors in London have been accredited to Ireland as well-- that is, they are nonresident ambassadors. The Irish welcomed this arrangement. Indeed, their relation toward the two Middle Eastern countries is warm, but Ireland enjoyed not getting involved with security problems connected with guarding sensitive installations. They have enough homemade security problems in connection with British rule in Northern Ireland and the Catholic underground there.

Since no Arab country maintains an embassy or a representation in Ireland, neither did Israel demand that its presence be demonstrated. However, following a MENA report, it transpired that Egypt has decided to open a representation in Dublin. The Israeli Foreign Ministry decided not to lag behind, and tonight, during a reception in Dublin marking Israel's 30th anniversary, Ambassador Avraham Qidron raised the issue before his guests. Israel's demand to open an official representation in Dublin will be dealt with in depth today between Mr Qidron and the Irish foreign minister, Michael O'Kennedy. Opening a representation in Dublin to maintain a balance with Egypt will cost the Israeli taxpayer approximately 12 million Israeli pounds a year. [end recording]

As opposed to the above report, our political correspondent reports that the Foreign Ministry has flatly denied what was reported and our correspondent has been told that Ambassador Qidron visited Ireland within the framework of a routine visit of a nonresident ambassador in the country to which he is accredited.

(M) BEGIN DISCUSSES FIRST YEAR IN OFFICE; FUTURE

TA171853Y Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1705 GMT 17 May 78 TA

[From the Evening Newsreel]

[Excerpts] A year ago today the nation of Israel went to the polls to elect its representatives to the ninth Knesset. When the polls closed and the votes were counted, we gained a new word in the vocabulary of the renewed Hebrew language--turnover [mahapakh]. Our political correspondent Shalom Qital went to the leader of the Likud, who that same day became the prime minister of Israel, Menahem Begin, and had a chat with him. [begin recording]

[Question] We are in the prime minister's office. On the table there are several editions of the book REVOLT in English, and this certainly was not part of the scenery in the prime minister's office only a year ago. Mr Prime Minister, maybe this in fact symbolizes the turnover?

[Answer] I have never used the term turnover; it is an artificial word. There were democratic elections in Israel. The public raised the Likud to the rank of the first party, with authority to form a cabinet. The books lying here are, it is true, the books of the revolt and friends ask me to autograph a book for them. I do it willingly almost every day, sometimes in Hebrew, sometimes in English, sometimes in another language. Look, these are completely human things, they have no connection with the cabinet's work, of course. I will continue to do this willingly at my friends' requests.

As for this day, in accordance with the accepted reckoning, it is a year since the elections in Israel. I want to say that this is a good day, in my evaluation, for the decisive majority of the people of Israel. True, I do not deny it, we also have difficulties in the political sphere, there are still difficulties in the economic sphere, but this is basically a good cabinet. It has done a great deal to change the situation for the better. I remember what was written in the press and in the international press a year ago or half a year ago, what issues were written about.

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Today there is argument on political, economic issues, but, from the moral aspect the situation has been very greatly improved and we will indeed continue to serve the nation in accordance with the trust we have been given.

[Question] I remember, Mr Begin, that you spoke about a different spirit which you expected in this nation. After a year--true, it is only a year, but nevertheless a year--is there a different spirit in this nation? After such dramatic changes in rule?

[Answer] Yes, I think the spirit is different here. There is proof that the public could democratically establish a new cabinet. There is a difference. Right, I will not deny it. There were two periods: during the first period, there was a lifting of spirits; now there are the difficulties. Let us not forget that there was the dramatic event, the visit by the president of Egypt, As-Sadat, to Jerusalem and today there are difficulties because we are being asked to give everything, to retreat to the lines of 4 June 1967. These are demands to surrender. We are naturally not accepting them. We must stand up to this test. I think that we are standing up very well. The same applies to the relations with the United States. Last July and December there was a lifting of spirits, now we have difficulties. Decisions have been made which are grave as far as we are concerned. So, of course, there are different views among the public, but these are completely natural things. We are halfway along the road. We are approaching changes for the better in the future.

[Question] What would you like to accomplish? Let us speak of at least another 3 years until the official date of the next elections.

[Answer] First, I would like war to be prevented. Secondly, that we bring peace close and make it. We will not cease to act and to think in both these directions, even with all the difficulties that have been created.

Of course, I would like a basic change with regard to those suffering families who are living, with many children, in bad housing conditions. We have, in fact, done something about this and we have called on the nation. Of course, the solution cannot come all at once, but we have called on the Jewish people to help and aid has been promised us to solve this problem. I hope that during this period we will do a great deal to solve it. The minister of housing and construction is making efforts.

I would like the moral problems to be solved, relations between man and man, development of the economy. We have done very important things in this sphere. We have brought in free high school education. This is a most important reform and all praise is due to the minister of education and the minister of finance who came to a practical agreement on this matter. Well, all these things are still ahead of us. [end recording]

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EGYPT

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STATEMENTS BY EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT AS-SADAT

ON THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

MARCH - MAY 1978

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This report presents a compilation of excerpted statements and interviews by President as-Sadat, from mid-March to date, on the status of the Egyptian-Israeli peace process. With the exception of a London OBSERVER interview, the sources are Egyptian--Cairo radio, press or the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY. The excerpts are presented chronologically by transmittal or publication date.

SUMMARY OF AS-SADAT'S VIEWS

As-Sadat has been consistent on the basic principles of a peace settlement with Israel. He has repeatedly said that Israel must express willingness to withdraw from the occupied Arab territories and to solve all aspects of the Palestinian issue, as well as discuss the question of security for all parties concerned. Israel's agreement to these principles, he has suggested, would provide a "common language" enabling peace negotiations to proceed.

He has at times hinted at flexibility, however. He told the Cairo OCTOBER on 2 April, for example, that Egypt's interpretation of Resolution 242 envisages Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories "with slight amendments to be made to the West Bank by the parties concerned," leaving open the nature of such amendments. While he has continued to reiterate the Palestinians'"right to self-determination and to establish their state on their own land," as in his May Day speech, he told the New York TIMES a few days later that if Israel objects to a Palestinian state, "then it should return the West Bank to Jordan and the Gaza Strip to Egypt as temporary steps to a peace settlement." He indicated that his proposal to return to the pre-5 June 1967 situation should be considered an example of the "more comprehensive view" than a "declaration of principles"--an approach needed now to spark renewed negotiations.

Describing himself as optimistic by nature, as-Sadat has frequently depicted the peace initiative with Israel as irreversible, needing only time to succeed. But he has also expressed his frustration with Israel's negotiation stands and tactics, accusing Israeli

leaders of clinging to "old concepts" and failing to respond positively to the new conditions created by his visit to Jerusalem. Asserting that he constantly tries to think of new proposals, he has called on Israel to advance "new ideas" and, as he said on 30 May, "for sure there will be new elements from our side."

As-Sadat has only rarely entertained the possibility that the peace process might fail. He repeated to CBS in mid-March his earlier pledge that should his peace efforts fail he would submit his resignation to the People's Assembly. In remarks in mid-March and late May he clearly indicated that he regards October 1978 as a watershed for the peace initiative, claiming that the Sinai II disengagement agreement will "expire" then, along with the annually renewable mandate for the UN Emergency Force in the Sinai. While suggesting that he expects the peace process to continue until then, he implied that he will reassess his approach next October if no results have been achieved. He has been vague as to future options, assuring foreign journalists on 30 May that failure would not mean "the end of the world" and that "another language, another system" could be tried.

To spur negotiations, as-Sadat has often called for the United States to become a "full partner" in the peace process, but as of late May he said he was still waiting for this to happen. Usually declining to spell out any specific actions he would like Washington to take, he did tell the Chicago TRIBUNE in late May that the United States should at least express its opinion as to whether or not particular proposals promote a just peace.

STATEMENTS BY EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT AS-SADAT ON THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

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--Interview with U.S. correspondents in al-Fayyum, Egypt, on 11 March 1978; Cairo domestic service, 11 March 1978

[Question] Mrs. Golda Meir has said that Mr. Begin has threatened the whole basis of negotiations because of his interpretation of Resolution 242 as regards the West Bank. You agree that he is threatening the whole basis of negotiations?

[Answer] Well, I have already stated my position. Yes, he is threatening the whole basis, not only of the negotiations but also the initiative we started.

[Question] Do you fear now that the whole initiative which you have started [words indistinct]

[Answer] I never fear anything will affect that. But it is possible. . . .

[Question] But if you were President Carter, what would you have him say to Mr. Begin?

[Answer] Why should I be President Carter? As I told you, on my last trip to the States I declared that America is a full partner. Let us hope that President Carter will resume his responsibility as a full partner in the whole problem.

[Question] Has this past month of shuttle diplomacy by Mr. Atherton been a waste since it has achieved so little, if anything at all?

[Answer] No, I can't say that it has been failure at all. There has never been really anything that materialized from this trip. But still this shuttle brings from time to time some points here and there nearer to each other. I don't consider it a failure at all.

[Question] Mr. President, I am sure you will be watching the outcome of Prime Minister Begin's visit to Washington this coming week very closely, even though you will be in Upper Egypt. You are hoping, of course, that the United States and President Carter may come forth with their own peace formula to break this deadlock. You are hoping that, are you not?

[Answer] Well, I am not suggesting anything at all to President Carter except this: That he act as a full partner. I don't suggest any specific way for him to deal also. I want to see him as a full partner. I have been in the States and I found that all the American public opinion agrees to this.

--Interview with London OBSERVER correspondent Gavin Young in al-Fayyum, Egypt, on 11 March 1978 [Interview was published in the OBSERVER on 12 March 1978]

"The whole world opinion is with me. I have chosen my fate. Nothing can put the clock back now." In these glowing terms President as-Sadat of Egypt expressed himself yesterday. Talking to me in a fishermen's hostel in the al-Fayyum oasis 50 miles from Cairo, he added smiling: "So I am not preparing for war or anything like that."

As the Israeli prime minister, Mr. Menahem Begin, prepared yesterday to fly to Washington to see President Carter, . . . the burden of what [as-Sadat] said was that it takes a very long time indeed to prove his peace initiative a failure. "I don't know what Syria and the PLO will do when they see my initiative has finally succeeded. 'Arafat is in a fix.' . . .

Earlier Mr. as-Sadat had said: "I never go back on my word. And I want to stress six points. I have offered them to Israel. "One, demilitarized zones; two, limited armament zones behind the demilitarized zones and a much bigger demilitarized zone in Sinai because it is much bigger than Israel; four, [as published] UN forces in Sharm ash-Shaykh; five, a combined Egyptian-Israeli committee to supervise the peace agreement; and six--I said to Weizman, the Israeli defense minister: 'if I were in your shoes I'd give up all the other five for point six'--open boundaries, diplomatic and economic relations and exchanges, normal exchanges between two good neighbors." Mr. as-Sadat went on: "However the dictionary describes good neighborliness, I will offer it Mr. Begin."

--Interview with Cairo OCTOBER chief editor, Anis Mansur; MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY, 11 March 1978 [Interview was published in OCTOBER on 12 March 1978]

[Question] . . . Would a question on the beginning of your peace initiative somehow be out of date because we are supposed to ask now about the results of the initiative and not about the steps leading to it?

[Answer] . . . But I can confirm, and it is well known, that on 4 February 1971, 22 years after the beginning of the Israeli-Arab conflict, I announced that I was prepared for a peace agreement. I said that Israel could withdraw in stages. I advocated that UN envoy Jarring come to complete the withdrawal between the Arabs and Israel in 6 months. I said this very clearly but my call was not heard and nobody paid attention to it. . . . The meaning of my call was that we should face reality and clearly understand that Israel was not an alleged state, that nobody could throw it into the sea, that we had not been able to do this and cannot do it now

and that Israel was backed by a rich and strong mother, which supplied it with rockets and gold and extended it unlimited protection. This is a fact. I asked that we go beyond admitting the fait accompli by moving this fait accompli in the direction of peace. . . .

When I was in the United States I declared that the United States itself cannot be a mere witness of a contract to be concluded between Egypt and Israel and neither can it be a mere guarantor of the Geneva conference but that it is a party. This is a fact or else how can we explain that the United States supports and gives unbounded protection to Israel. It is a party and must remain so

I say with all frankness and no embarrassment whatsoever that I embarked on my initiative because nobody before me dared to do so and nobody after me will dare to do so. The initiative tops the October victories. Even more, the initiative has been a crowning for October, and this fact is appreciated only by those who suffered the setback sustained in the 1967 war.

[Question] . . . A widespread foreign expression [describes] what is going on in the Arab area [as] a boiling pot. Because this pot is boiling, things in it are simmering and everything is in constant motion and in a continuous flow. Do you believe that this description is correct?

[Answer] This expression or this description is correct to some extent. However, it is inaccurate. This is so because what is happening is more serious and deeper than saying that things are simmering in the pot. This motion is closed and limited. More correctly said, things are moving in "a narrow vicious circle." As such, this is a futile motion.

But what I now perceive is more splendid and greater. If history has imperative laws, then the first of these laws is the dynamism of history, that is, history's forward motion, because history knows neither reversals nor setbacks. However, history always forges ahead There will be no going back on the Egyptian psychological, military and national results of the October victories. And there will be no going back on the peaceful initiative. This initiative has taken its place and has chosen its method. It is heading forward, rapidly or slowly. . . .

If we viewed the initiative and divested it of all its advantages and we were hard on ourselves, the least we would accept is that the initiative would show what we would be like in 1997--that is, 20 years after the initiative was declared.

Since we deduct these 20 years from our political life and add them to our ages and the ages of the generations that come after us, we must continue to foster the initiative. It is certain that we have not lost and will not lose anything. . . .

[Question] Mr. President, if the Israeli Government does not respond to the spirit of the initiative in the coming months what would happen after that?

[Answer] This would not mean that the peace initiative has stopped or even fumbled. It would mean that it needs time. The broth still needs a low fire to cook. The relationship between Egypt and Israel will continue to exist until October when the second disengagement agreement and the mandate of the UN Emergency Forces stationed between Egypt and Israel expire. Let us wait and see what will happen.

—Interview with New York TIMES columnist, James Reston; MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY, 12 March 1978 [Interview was published in the New York TIMES on 9 March 1978]

President as-Sadat has stated that he believes that the time has come for U.S. President Jimmy Carter to state his terms for breaking the diplomatic stalemate in the Middle East.

In [the Reston] interview . . . , President as-Sadat said that in his view, the United States should assume its responsibility as a partner and not as a mediator in the negotiations.

President as-Sadat defined his idea of President Carter's responsibility, saying: My definition of this responsibility is that peace is more important and precious than a piece of land. He added that he would like President Carter to apply what he has already declared in the field of human rights and the nonacquisition of others' land by force. This is a moral issue

President as-Sadat added that he would have understood if Begin had refused to invite him to Israel last November on the ground that more time was needed to prepare such a radical diplomatic switch. The president further said that Begin had misled the public on Egypt's policy on the Sinai passes, the Israeli settlements and President as-Sadat's promise not to permit a main force of the Egyptian armed forces to go east beyond the Jidda and Mitla passes after the restoration of Sinai in a peace agreement.

In his interview, President as-Sadat said that a great opportunity was being lost in not proceeding faster with the diplomatic opportunity which his visit to Israel has provided. The president explained that Egypt is the biggest Arab state, the state where

the decision of war or peace is taken. He added: This area has got trust of and friendly relations with the United States. This has never taken place before. We were waiting for confrontations all the time in the past. We were in contradiction all the time, but there is a deep trust now, and I think this is a very important moment in the history of the conflict.

President as-Sadat went on: Nobody knows what will happen tomorrow. A new president might come and act exactly like President Johnson acted before, or another president might come here in Egypt and he might not like to follow the same course. But all I can tell you is that my people intend to have the best relations with the United States.

Regarding his personal impressions since the Middle East negotiations were suspended recently, President as-Sadat said that when he went to Washington last month, he was extremely disheartened but his morale rose after his talks with President Carter and his visits with Western European leaders. President as-Sadat added that President Carter has always had such an effect on him.

He said: Last April, I was with President Carter and we were discussing peace, natural peace. There were three items on our agenda: the land occupied after the 1967 war, the nature of peace and the Palestinian problem. On the first issue, we did not differ. On the nature of peace, we spent long hours discussing it.

President Carter told me that Israel is asking for diplomatic relations, open borders, government exchanges, normal relations and so forth. I told him that Israel should declare that it is ready to return the land it occupied after 1967 and that every party should have the right to discuss the security issue, because I recognize that there is a security issue for Israel that should be dealt with in this declaration. Israel should declare that it is ready to solve the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. In return, I said that I admit that the Israeli security issue must be met. . . .

Regarding the principal issues in the Middle East negotiations, President as-Sadat said that he can only propose perseverance and hope that Israeli Prime Minister Menahem Begin will one day realize that as-Sadat's visit to Jerusalem has truly presented a new concept and a new opportunity for peace in the Middle East. Despite this, President as-Sadat added that he does not see any indication that the Israeli leader has adapted himself to the facts. There is nothing that indicates that he will do so unless President Carter presents specific recommendations which Israel cannot ignore. . . .

James Reston added: President as-Sadat considers that this moment passes quickly in history and that the dangers ensuing from delaying the exploitation of this moment are greater than risking the achievement of peace.

While as-Sadat talks about an overall settlement in this troubled area of the world, Begin speaks of the settlements. Reston quotes the president as saying that love can solve numerous problems and that if the matter is one of his living in neighborliness, in the full sense of neighborliness, then I am ready for this. Reston added: And this is the reason which induced President as-Sadat to decide to go to Jerusalem. Reston illustrated the president's viewpoint in this respect by saying that prior to the Jerusalem visit, the Israeli Government would not believe anything President as-Sadat said. He, too, would not believe anything Menahem Begin said. Furthermore, amid such suspicions and fears, going to an expanded Geneva conference would be futile. Consequently, it became imperative to do something which would effectively change the atmosphere.

Reston said that President as-Sadat was asked why he acted so hastily and why he believes in surprise diplomacy. The president answered that he believed that someone had to smash the psychological barrier between us and Israel and this could come about only through a shock which would alert people and move them to new ways of thinking.

--Interview with CBS; MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY, 14 March 1978

President as-Sadat said it would probably have been easier to reach a peaceful settlement through negotiations if Henry Kissinger were still the U.S. secretary of state or if Golda Meir or Moshe Dayan were the prime minister of Israel. He said he is sorry to make such public observations about Henry Kissinger, but he and Kissinger would have been able to reach a settlement in a matter of three weeks.

President as-Sadat said that Vance, Kissinger's successor to the post of U.S. secretary of state, is a dear friend of ours. He is an honest person, very honest, indeed, but the question is one of approach and Vance is following a different approach. When asked whether Golda Meir could have made a greater effort to stimulate the peace talks if these talks had begun during her era, President as-Sadat said: I am sorry to say "yes." This may annoy Menahem Begin but I say "yes."

President as-Sadat said that prior to his visit to Jerusalem Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu had told him that Menahem Begin was a man who is searching for peace. President as-Sadat's initiative came

immediately after that. President as-Sadat added that he had recently paid Ceausescu another visit. Ceausescu advised President as-Sadat to be patient. President as-Sadat said: I follow an old German maxim: Patience brings roses. . . .

President as-Sadat said that if his peace initiative fails, he will have the courage to go to the Egyptian parliament to submit his resignation and to say that he has miscalculated.

--Speech welcoming members of the African Parliamentary Union to Cairo on 16 March 1978; MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY, 16 March 1978

Well, you are visiting Cairo, your African capital, at a very difficult time. A few days ago this area experienced extremely regrettable incidents that have now reached their climax in the offensive Israel has carried out against southern Lebanon and in its return to the policy of imposing conditions through occupying the land of others by force and killing innocent civilians under the slogan of security. We have condemned the killing of Israeli civilians as vigorously as we have condemned Israel's killing of Arab civilians, occupation of southern Lebanon and imposition of its conditions.

Allow me to say this: We have a very clear stand in this respect--that is, that we do not in any way approve of the fact that security requires occupation of the land of others or violation of their sovereignty. We shall continue to exert the utmost efforts to achieve a peaceful solution. . . .

In the Arab-Israeli conflict, Israel must know that force will not provide security, that the occupation of the territory of others will not provide security and that the violation of the sovereignty of others will not provide security. Security can be provided through neighborly relations, not through the use of force. If Israel has power today, we all have power also. Since I began my initiative I have said that we should sit down as civilized people to discuss any issues we need to confront, not resort to the use of force.

Egypt condemns the actions Israel has carried out during the last two days. We will continue to condemn such actions. We will watch what happens in the very near future. We must plan to continue [the peace process] and draw up our plans in this regard. I will call for the convocation of the National Security Council for this purpose. I believe we had reached a point where we were about to solve the whole problem peacefully. When Israel resorts again to the use of force, to the occupation of the territory of others by force and to dictating its conditions, we denounce this as we denounced it before and will denounce it in the future.

Israel must realize that the time of dictating conditions has gone. Israel must also know that bloodshed will not solve problems and that bloodshed will not lead to the achievement of peace in this area. Israel must finally know that solving the Palestinian problem is the first sound move for the establishment of peace in our area.

--Dialog with a delegation of U.S. university professors in Cairo on 26 March 1978; MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY, 26 March 1978

In reply to a question, President as-Sadat said: "Well, let me tell you in all frankness that we can achieve peace in the area here provided that the new conception and the new facts that have appeared here in the area after my visit to Jerusalem, whenever this new conception prevails, I assure you, not in months, but in days we can reach a solution. [sentence as received] In Egypt, here, we must have got rid of all problems: bitterness, hatred. . . . We had our revenge in the October war. . . .

The other language that we are hearing is from the Israeli side. They are still holding the old conception. For that, for instance, when we say that we are ready for good neighborhood . . . we are ready to convene tomorrow, provided that no good neighbor treads on his neighbor's land or property. This is our language. Their language is that they are trying to exploit security, which we have recognized. I recognize that there is an issue of security for Israel that should be met by all of us in the Arab world. But, on the other hand, they should meet also our security. I recognized their right to be secure and offered six points for this security [and] to sit round a table and talk like civilized people and reach an agreement provided, as I said, that nobody treads on other's land or property. Their language is that they need our land for security. They need our sovereignty for security, and they want to impose the old way of conditions, which they could not impose even after our defeat. They could not impose any political decisions. The whole thing was under the name of peace, security and, well, we are speaking two different languages.

President as-Sadat went on to say; I am optimistic and I shall be optimistic and we shall always honor our initiative and honor our obligations--what we have already stated and, as I told Begin before he left for the States, I never go back on my word. Whatever obligations we have stated we are ready to fulfill. . .as I said during my last visit to President Carter in Washington. . .from our part we shall never let you down at all. It is a matter of time only..

In reply to another question, the president said: Well, let me tell you this. In my last visit to the United States I stated before the Foreign Relations Committee in the Congress and in the Senate and to President Carter and before the American people that the United States is not a cochairman only in this Geneva conference. . . . No, the United States should act as a full partner. I told Begin this before he left for the States. I told President Carter this in Camp David, and again I declared it after I arrived here. "You are to act as a full partner, not as a mediator or so and so. . . ."

In answer to another question, President as-Sadat said: "Well, you must be fair when you ask me such a question, because I can guarantee the security of Israel from my borders in Sinai. If I am asked more than this, well, I shall have to study it. But whenever we go direct to the crux of the whole problem, and this is the Palestinian problem, if we go directly and solve it, ninety percent of these side issues will be solved automatically. I am ready to provide security on my borders and to help security on others' borders." . . .

[Question] Could you sketch for us what you would like to see in Egypt happen in the next 10 or 20 years in social-economic development in general?

[Answer] Well, let me tell you this--the military expenditure, you cannot imagine how it harms my economy here. One hundred million pounds only--if they can be spared from the military expenditure, miracles can be achieved here. For that, I am really doing my best to reach peace and to establish peace, because this country needs to be reconstructed on the latest technology and it is available now--the United States, starting with Europe, all Western Europe, England, Germany, France and we are already having joint ventures with you or with others. But lots can be achieved. . . .

Answering another question, President as-Sadat said: "Well, the difficulty with the Israelis really [word indistinct] that there are, as I told you, sticking to the old conception. Then after my initiative, when we were discussing the declaration of principles, what I really meant by this declaration of principles is that Israel declare its will to withdraw from the land occupied after 1967, according to Resolution 242 of the Security Council, and solve the Palestinian question in all its aspects. Even those who are very hysterical against me in the Arab world, and to take President al-Asad as an example of this hysteria, he said that he is for a peaceful solution but not through as-Sadat. Whenever Israel declares that it is willing to withdraw from the land occupied after 1967, provided that every party should sit with Israel to discuss the security issues, and its willingness to solve the Palestinian problem, there will be no one in the Arab world who will not welcome it, automatically."

--Interview with Cairo OCTOBER chief editor, Anis Mansur; MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY, 25 March 1978 [Interview was published an OCTOBER on 26 March 1978]

[As-Sadat] When I talk about the logic of history--that is, the inevitability of the logic of history--I mean that everything must go forward no matter what. Peace without bloodshed must be achieved because bloodshed will only cause more bloodshed; violence only breeds more violence. What Israel has done over the past 30 years and over the past few days will intensify bitterness and hatred. Israel has expanded its territory but has not increased its security, and it has spilled blood but has not dried its tears. The road that begins with blood and tears is the same road which ends, if it ever does, with the same shedding of innocent blood and more innocent tears. This is what I wanted to put an end to when I called for a peace agreement, when I called for disengagement and for reopening the Suez Canal and when I took the initiative for peace for the present generation of our people, for the whole world and for the coming generations. We must not lose hope in the call for peace. We must not stop. This is our destiny. . . .

[As-Sadat] The [14 March 1978] Israeli invasion of Lebanon has exposed all the rejection front states, particularly Syria. In Tripoli, the conferees decided that any aggression against any front member state would be an aggression against the other states. An aggression took place against the Palestinian people, who are a party to the rejection front. We regard the Palestinian question as the core of the whole problem. If Israel came to an agreement with all the confrontation states without solving the Palestinian problem,

there would be no peace in the area. This is our position, which is a principled one. . . .

All that these rejectionists have is the ridiculous expression which they have learned from the Soviets--namely, a separate solution, that is, that Egypt is seeking a separate solution with Israel. Where is that separate solution now? Who is agreeing, plotting and partitioning Arab territory with Israel now? . . .

[Question] Mr. President, what exactly is the relationship between the Palestinian resistance and Egypt, if there is a relationship?

[As-Sadat] We have received the appeal Yasir 'Arafat addressed to the Arab kings and presidents. Egypt will not abandon its commitment to the Palestinian people, despite the PLO stand on the disengagement and the peace initiative. Egypt had its say after the Tel Aviv operation. Egypt stressed that peace is the only way to avoid bloodshed and bitterness in the area and that there can be no peace if the Palestinian question is not solved. The Palestinians must realize who it is who means what he says under all circumstances, defends their rights and also defends their right to live, have a homeland and lead a dignified life and who receives them, buys and sells them, crushes and exterminates them. . . .

--Remarks at a meeting with U.S. businessmen on 31 March 1978;
Cairo domestic service, 31 March 1978

. . . President as-Sadat said: We demand the liberation of all territories Israel occupied in 1967. We also demand that the Palestinians be granted the right of self-determination within a period of 5 years. The president added: Menahem Begin must abandon the hardline policy which he is following and which nobody agrees with. Nobody can agree with what Begin said in his speech to the Knesset when he referred to his discussions with U.S. President Carter. President as-Sadat went on: No Arab can possibly agree to this hardline policy of Begin, who wants peace, the land, sovereignty and everything else at the same time.

The president added that he had asked 'Ezer Weizman today to tell Begin that Begin has not yet responded to his peace initiative. President as-Sadat added: The peace initiative is firm. We will be ready to start the negotiations when we reach a common language in order not to disappoint the entire world again, by breaking off the discussions. . . .

Replying to a question on the Israeli Government's stand on the peace initiative, he said he believes that Israel is not ready to accept his initiative. President as-Sadat said he is prepared to establish neighborly relations in every sense of the word but that he will not agree to the squandering of a single inch of territory or of sovereignty. The president added that as for the question of security, he is prepared to discuss this question. He said he has submitted six points which could serve as a basis for solving this problem. . . .

Asked about the problem of the Palestinian refugees, President as-Sadat replied: The political aspect of this problem will be solved as soon as Israel declares that it will withdraw from the territories occupied in the June 1967 aggression. If such a declaration is made and each of the parties concerned discusses the question of security with Israel, then the refugees problem could be solved at this level.

Asked what went on during today's discussions [with Weizman], the president said he had informed the Israelis this time that we are searching for peace and not for bilateral settlements. We want to reach a final peace in the area and the peace initiative was taken for this purpose.

The president added that when the Palestinian problem is solved and the question of Israel's security is discussed, he will be prepared to sign an agreement with the Israelis. Syria will also follow, as it has always done. The president referred in this respect to Syria's stand on the first disengagement agreement and its attitude during the 1949 Rhodes negotiations. . . .

--Interview with Cairo OCTOBER chief editor, Anis Mansur; MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY, 2 April 1978 [Interview was published in OCTOBER on 2 April 1978]

[Question] Before Israeli Defense Minister 'Ezer Weizman came to visit you in Al-Qanatir al-Khayriyah, some Arab newspapers and radio stations made strong denunciations, asking: How can you meet with the Israeli defense minister after what has happened in southern Lebanon, after Menahem Begin has adopted obstinate stands and after all his repeated statements on the whole issue and the peace initiative?

[Answer] . . . I am really surprised that anyone should denounce 'Ezer Weizman's visit to Egypt. Why shouldn't he come and why shouldn't we receive him at any time? We decided at the beginning of the initiative that we would maintain contact so as to understand and come to some understanding with one another. This decision was permanent. . . . There is no need for war as long as peace is possible, and there is no need for fighting--which is possible at any moment--so long as peace is possible.

How will I know Israel's views and proposals if there is no contact between us? How will I know if Israel desires to hold a new discussion or resume the dialog if I do not meet with one of its men? . . .

[Question] One interpretation of the visit, even before it took place, was that it meant the resumption of the military committee meetings and that it would not be long before the political committee would resume its activity. . . .

[Answer] 'Ezer Weizman's visit did not mean the resumption of the work of the military committee. He came in his capacity as an Israeli minister and official. This visit is a link in the series of contacts initiated between Egypt and Israel to prevent a stalemate and to prevent the situation from returning to what it was before the initiative, although such a return is impossible because the world has changed completely since the initiative. . . . Neither the military committee nor the political committee will meet unless there is a change warranting the resumption of the meetings of one of the committees, or both. When that happens, I will announce it. . . .

We [as-Sadat and Weizman] discussed two important topics. The first topic, which was natural, was what had taken place in southern Lebanon. That was an urgent, crucial topic. The second topic was what had happened to the peace process after the suspension of the political and military committee meetings. . . . Before Weizman's arrival, I sent a message to Israel via the United States in which I fully objected to Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon. I said very clearly that Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon will be a principal obstacle in the way of peace and that it will be impossible to sit together as long as there is one Israeli soldier on Lebanese territory. . . .

Weizman told me officially that not a single Israeli soldier will remain on Lebanese territory a minute after the UN emergency forces take up their positions. That was an Israeli Government decision.

The second topic that we discussed was the peace initiative. It was natural that I should listen and speak. I listened and I emphasized Egypt's principled stand, which is that Egypt adheres to the letter and spirit of Resolution 242, which was issued by the UN Security Council in November 1967. This means withdrawal from the occupied territories with slight amendments to be made to the West Bank by the parties concerned. I affirmed the need for solving the Palestinian question, which is the essence of the dispute. I emphasized all this finally and unequivocally.

I told 'Ezer Weizman: Even if a separate peace agreement is achieved with each of the parties without solving the Palestinian question, there will never be peace in this area. This means that solving the Palestinian question in its political and humanitarian aspects is necessary and vital. The political aspect is the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and the humanitarian aspect is the refugee problem. . . . If we talk about the Palestinian issue, then it is natural that we discuss the question of Israeli security as well as Palestinian and Arab security. The problem of security is fundamental to Israel. . . . Therefore, we spent much time talking about security, their security as well as our security and the security of the Palestinians in the West Bank. We talked about the future of Palestine and how the Palestinians would govern themselves. I reasserted Egypt's viewpoint. . . . When we find common grounds between ourselves and Israel, the two committees will resume their work. Our meeting with Israeli defense minister, however, confirmed to us that there is a gap between our views and theirs, and gaps must be bridged for the sake of mutual peace.

--Speech at a meeting on 5 April 1978 with participants in an international information media conference that began 3 April 1978 in Cairo; MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY, 5 April 1978

[Question] I would like to ask you whether you will consider using other means to maintain your initiative and continue breaking what you called the psychological barriers. For

instance, would you endorse cultural exchanges or trade relations with Israel, something to get your two peoples closer together in place of the political and military talks which are not taking place now?

[Answer] . . . I am afraid that any other initiative like the one you suggested means putting the cart before the horse. How can we begin economic exchanges or open borders or take other actions like the ones you suggested while we are still talking in two different languages? . . . Therefore, it would be useless to begin anything new before we begin speaking the same language and before we have the same concept--the concept that should prevail in the wake of my visit to Jerusalem. During that visit we sat together around the table without complexes. The psychological complexes ended when I visited Jerusalem, delivered my speech before the Knesset and spoke to the Israeli people through the Knesset. Only in this way we can establish peace. However, I do not see how we can make any progress through such actions as the ones you spoke about. . . .

[Question] Mr. President, could a third party such as the United States, Britain or any other party help in getting the negotiations going again?

[Answer] Well, the United States is actually helping. You recall that during my recent visit to the United States and my talks with President Carter in February I asked President Carter, the House of Representatives and the Senate to play their roles as full partners. President Carter has indeed played his part, and I believe that with adequate diplomacy we can reach the point where the talks can be resumed. Meanwhile, as you have heard, I received Israeli Defense Minister 'Ezer Weizman in Cairo. He may come again. I have already said that I have no objections in this respect. I told him the last time he was here--2 days ago--that he would be welcome whenever there are new ideas that could constitute a starting point and that could make us speak the same language instead of two languages.

[Question] Mr. President, would you like the United States to join you at the negotiations table with a comprehensive program, and do you have any assurances from President Carter's administration that if the deadlock continues they will submit a detailed plan?

. . .The U.S. role is extremely important. As I said before, the United States--President Carter--is not merely the cochairman of the Geveva conference and not merely a mediator. No. President Carter is a full partner, and he agrees. This is quite satisfactory to me.

[Question] . . .Do you fear that if something happens to you, your initiative will fail and the rejectionists will have the upper hand?

[Answer] . . .My people want peace based on justice regardless of whether I remain in my position here or I am out of the presidency. I am sure that this will continue because it is what my people want. What I have done is not my personal initiative or will. . . .

[Question] Mr. President, President Carter has declared a number of principles to be a basis for your talks with Israel. Are these principles acceptable to you as declared and presented by President Carter?

[Answer] Yes. I declared this in Aswan. I confirm it once again. They are acceptable to me whether in relation to the declaration of principles or to the whole peace process.

[Question] Mr. President, we understand that the Israelis are expecting certain counterproposals from the Egyptian side. Have these been made? If not, what are the basic conditions for resuming the political or military talks, or both?

[Answer] Let me tell you this: Israeli Prime Minister Menahem Begin presented what he called his plan. When he asked me to submit a counterproposal, our plan was basically connected with the Palestinian question. We cannot speak on behalf of the Palestinians on topics connected with the Palestinian problem, but we can assume the responsibility of guaranteeing the declaration of the basic strategic principles which had been agreed upon at the Arab summit conference. We have, therefore, submitted our counterproposals in relation to this fact only. You ask about conditions. These are the conditions we made for the talks. We have not set any absolute conditions. We do not set any conditions but we say that there are certain basic principles which must be adopted. I believe that the whole world recognizes these principles, namely, that there must be no violation of the territory or sovereignty of others. . .

--Speech at banquet for Afghan President Daud on 6 April 1978; Cairo domestic service, 6 April 1978

...As I have said on several occasions, we firmly believe that the Palestinian people's question is the core and essence of the conflict. Therefore, it--and nothing else--is the key to a settlement as well as the starting point. It would be impossible to reach a just and lasting settlement without solving this problem in a way satisfactory to the Palestinian people and acceptable to the international community, which has recognized this struggling people's right to self-determination...I want to reiterate here that we cannot accept a settlement of the problem unless it is based on Israel's comprehensive withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territory without exception and on the achievement of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.

We cannot be deceived by words or expressions of intent if these are not compatible with deeds and policy. Nor can we depart from substance to form or direct our attention to the negotiating process and treat this process as the goal when we consider it a means leading to the achievement of the goal. Hence we agree to continue the process to the degree that the other side shows readiness to respond.

--Interview with Cairo OCTOBER chief editor, Anis Mansur; MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY, 9 April 1978 [Interview was published in OCTOBER on 9 April 1978]

[Question] The swift meeting between you and the Israeli defense minister has opened the door to many interpretations and conclusions. Some are saying that Weizman is as-Sadat's favorite man, or that he is the desirable one as far as we are concerned, hinting that some are undesirable...

[Answer] I have noticed this. The reason for these interpretations is perhaps the fact that I expressed my opinion of 'Ezer Weizman after my visit to Jerusalem. I met the man in Jerusalem after an accident [to Weizman] and I spoke with him. I then saw him in Ismailia and said he was a nice man and a jolly conversationalist and that I like people like this who are both serious and merry. When I spoke about Moshe Dayan I said that during the Ismailia talks he was flexible and eager to find points of agreement and to defer discussion of the points of disagreement. Perhaps these remarks about the two men, and particularly about Weizman, were what prompted the press to see Weizman as the man I prefer

to talk to. However, I know for certain that the final political decision will be made by Begin, which is natural. . . . Political leaders in Israel and the United States have admitted to me that the initiative caught Begin unprepared. He did not expect that it was possible. He was not prepared for peace at all because he is intransigent by nature and did not take into account that we would give him a choice between the land which he had occupied and permanent peace for the Israeli people.

There have been discussions in Israel about land and peace. Ben-Gurion's view was that peace is more important than land. Moshe Dayan and others hold the view that land without peace is better than peace without land. It seems that Menahem Begin wants both land and peace, although he has a lot of occupied land but does not have peace. Land has not given Begin peace. Bar-Lev did not give Israel security.

Although my initiative has shaken Israel--and this expression is theirs and not mine--Begin is resisting all of world public opinion, especially Jewish, U.S. and European public opinion... Perhaps one of Menahem Begin's objectives is to drag us into peripheral problems and to keep our minds completely off the main issue of the principles. However, I believe it is my duty to be a bit patient and to give him a chance to comprehend the initiative, which was sudden and which has exposed his intransigence and obstinacy. Let me give one example. In the speech he delivered in Ismailia, Begin described the 1967 war as a defensive war and said that in order to defend Israel they had occupied Sinai, the Golan Heights and the Gaza Strip. I did not wish to comment on his speech. I felt that he was obliged to say this for party considerations, which are particularly important in Israel. I felt that the many party disputes and the complicated government coalition compelled him to say publicly what he did not say in private and that these were well-known political methods.

Despite all this--frankly and regrettably--Begin has not grasped the dimensions of the initiative. . . . The world now knows that Israel was imagining things when it was saying that the Arabs wanted war and wanted to throw Israel into the sea. Israel was imagining things because we want peace and have offered it and I have gone far beyond what any man imagined in any age. . . .

[Question] You say that there have been attempts to raise peripheral issues in order to divert us from the basic issue and that it is incumbent on us to be alert to these attempts. Can you recall anything which it would have been possible for us to fall into or which we might have unwittingly fallen into?

[Answer] There are certain political tricks resorted to by men who are very adept in the art of maneuvering. These tricks are used to gain time or to make us waste our time. Or, perhaps, if they draw us into these tricks, we might go from one mistake to another. Mistakes would then be aggravated and the gap would widen between the parties. By so doing, we would have cooperated in creating extensive misunderstandings leading to a total lack of understanding.

For example, take what is being said to the effect that Weizman is a person whom I have chosen and that Begin sends him from time to time. Then they draw the conclusion that this action will produce long-term results. Or take what is being said--and I have read it--about Begin's seeking help from two men between whom there is no love lost because they are brothers-in-law--namely, Weizman and Dayan--and that by having adopted Weizman, I am trying to strike at Dayan or at Begin and so on and so forth until we reach the limit of surprising political imagination. Another example of this is certain expressions or objectives used by the Egyptian journalists which angered Begin. Begin, in turn, tried to convey these expressions or adjectives to Israeli public opinion or to world Jewish public opinion, although it is possible for us to find similar, or even worse things, written by their own writers. But the purpose of these writings is to draw us into a domain other than the one we have chosen for resolving our problems.

Begin has tried in some form to suggest that Carter's government does not want him or that Carter's government is pressuring the Israeli people into removing Begin from office. The reason for this is that Weizman was well received in the United States too. President Carter has announced that nobody has said any such thing and that he has nothing to do with Israel's domestic policy. The objective was to draw the United States into offending the feelings of the Israeli public by capitalizing on U.S. interference in the internal affairs of the Israeli people.

Even worse than these things is an issue which was raised at an early stage, namely, the issue of the Israeli settlements in the occupied territory and the differences which arose within the Israeli Government over these settlements--and the Israelis did indeed differ over the settlements. Some are of the opinion that

it is necessary to establish more settlements at this time, that is, at a time when people are talking about the Cairo conference and the political and military committees. Others are of the opinion that there is no reason for building more settlements. In other words, the existing settlements should remain, and the idea of removing them is out of the question. In other words, the whole debate is over whether to be content with the number of settlements they have already set up until the situation crystallizes. Others are of the opinion that these settlements are of no military importance. The Bar-Lev line itself did not prevent our planes, rockets or infantry from penetrating it, fighting the Israelis and ultimately scoring victory.

On our side, we took up the issue of the settlements with the best intentions. It absorbed us until it drowned us and we forgot the more important issue--withdrawal from all the occupied territory, not only the evacuation of the residents of these settlements or the demolition or dismantling of these settlements. There are some prefabricated houses which had been set up in these settlements, and it would be easy to dismantle them when the need arises. 'Ezer Weizman told me in Ismailia and he had told General al-Jamasi that these settlements are of no military importance. Despite all the guarantees I have presented and announced Begin is still in a state of great fear. His fear centers more on the West Bank, because it is his greatest problem. He is prepared to go to the furthest extent in reaching an understanding and agreement, except concerning the West Bank.

[Question] . . .you have said that there is no new ground yet for understanding with Begin. What is the situation now and what will happen next?

[Answer] . . .All of us are a party to these issues. If war breaks out it will spread, and if peace is established it will spread too. . . . The states and peoples which supported the initiative must give a thrust to the peace process and must exert pressure for the establishment of peace. . . . In the meantime, we must not stand by as spectators because this is primarily our issue. Therefore, we must be the first to take care of, defend and champion this issue. The United States has the largest role in the process of peace or in the preparation for it and achieving it in the end. The United States is not a referee in a

game, a spectator or a volunteer mediator. The United States is a partner because it is the one which feeds Israel, spends on it and defends it for special considerations. . . . Had it not been for the United States, Israel would not have existed yesterday, today or tomorrow. This is another fact. These facts annoy the Israeli governments but they are facts. . . .

When the October war broke out, the United States interfered and landed its forces. Kissinger told me that the United States would not permit an Israeli defeat. . . . When the first disengagement took place, the first line of the agreement referred to a U.S. proposal, any U.S. proposal, for the disengagement of the two sides. This was followed by the shuttle or step-by-step policy among the belligerent sides and Israel. . . . There was another disengagement. All of these were the result of U.S. efforts in the first place. . . . The friendship between the United States and Egypt has been strengthened in the Nixon-Kissinger, Ford-Kissinger and Carter-Vance eras. The United States is now aware of all the details of the differences between Egypt and Israel or between the Arabs and Israel. . . . Egypt and the entire Arab nation have been subjected to tribulations with Israel--and only the United States has appeared as the one capable of moving situations forward, bringing them to a climax and also resolving them. The United States now is more capable of solving the problem than in the past.

[Question] When the United States sincerely wants something, it does not lack the means for finding a solution, as happened in Lebanon. . . . Why, therefore, has the United States so far been unable to achieve this in the dispute between us and Israel?

[Answer] . . . We hope the United States will do something similar to what has happened so rapidly in Lebanon in order to solve the conflict in the Middle East. Nevertheless, it is our duty to admit that the Arab-Israeli conflict is extremely complicated because it is multilateral, because the issues for which a solution is sought are complicated and because the Arabs are divided. . . .

[Question] You have told Israel, through the United States, that the presence of one Israeli soldier on Lebanese territory would be an obstacle to peace, and Weizman told you that Israel would not leave a single Israeli soldier on Lebanese territory after the UN forces take up their positions. What has been

achieved so far, for all parties, and will Israel return to bargaining now that it has added one more state to the confrontation states?

[Answer] . . . Israel has achieved nothing, a 5-km or even a 10-km belt has not brought Israel the security it wants. There are no secure borders any more. We disproved the secure-borders theory in the October war. Furthermore, in addition to the fact that this aggression has not and never will achieve security for Israel, it will never destroy the Palestinians. This means that Begin has not fulfilled his two original objectives, which are achieving security and destroying the resistance. . . .

[Question] You proclaimed a green revolution and went to the desert and all Egypt's programs, plans and hopes went with you. Is the reason for this the fact that the peace issue has preoccupied us more than necessary and that we must occupy ourselves with something else, or do you believe that the peace question will take a long time and that we would be wasting our time and energy if we were to stop all other aspects of life in anticipation of new ideas from Tel Aviv or Washington?

[Answer] I have read that some analysts who claim to know everything have claimed that I directed my attention to the invasion of the desert in order to divert the people's attention from the peace initiative and that I am trying to divert the attention of the people from the very complicated external affairs. This is strange because how could a person divert the attention of the people from their daily problems. . . . I would have understood if it were claimed that problems of foreign policy were raised to divert the people's attention from the problems of daily life, although this too is impossible because the problems of peace cannot be separated from our economic and social problems. . . .

--Interview with foreign correspondents in Aswan on 14 April 1978; MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY, 14 April 1978

President Anwar as-Sadat has affirmed that Egypt will continue its endeavors to establish peace in the Middle East as long as these endeavors are proceeding along their course. They have not failed so far.

In reply to questions by foreign journalists after Friday prayers in an-Nasr Mosque in Aswan, President as-Sadat said: The decision to rule out war as a means of solving the conflict in the area is not new. Progress toward

peace is continuing after the peace initiative which I have embarked upon. We have dismissed the path of war and we are now proceeding on the path to peace.

Asked about statements indicating that war is no longer one of the choices, the president said: Why do we use the word "war" now? We are continuing the peace process until we determine that it has failed. It has not failed so far.

--Remarks at meeting with U.S. evangelical churches delegation in Aswan; Cairo domestic service, 15 April 1978

...The president added: Then Begin visited the United States and he sent me a message in which he asked me to meet him anywhere. I answered: Why don't we meet in Ismailia? When he came to Ismailia, I was filled with hope that the Israelis would accept the same positions and the same new concepts which we had adopted in Egypt. When we met, Begin informed me that the cabinet had decided to return Sinai to Egypt and that our border is the international border with Palestine. President as-Sadat commented on this statement, saying: This border has been an international one for thousands of years.

The president said: Afterward, Begin notified me that Israel would retain the settlements and that these settlements would be guarded by the Israeli army. I told him: Let us leave all these things for the political and military committees which we have agreed to form.

The president added: Sinai is not a problem as far as I am concerned. However, I am seeking a lasting peace, and if we do not solve the Palestinian problem we will not achieve peace in the area. This is what I told Israeli Defense Minister Weizman when he visited me some 10 days ago.

President as-Sadat added: Begin then returned to Israel, and I realized that the issue of the settlements on my land and at the expense of my sovereignty is not negotiable. However, Begin wants to make it so. At this point I really felt frustrated.

The president then spoke of his visit to the United States last February and his meeting with President Carter. The president said that, in the wake of his visit, he returned with renewed desire to continue with the initiative.

The president added: When I met 'Ezer Weizman 10 days ago, I told him that I had sensed no progress, neither on the Palestinian problem, which is the core of the issue, nor on Sinai, which I do not consider a problem at all. This is not a problem because the presence of settlements on my land is illegal and tolerates no discussion.

The president said: It might occur to you to ask me: What then? Well, I promised the Israeli people that the October war would be the last war. I then informed them that Israel has a right to live in security. This is still my position up to this moment. When they are ready for peace, I will be ready for peace, but not at the expense of our land or our sovereignty. . . .

The president said that he and President Carter have an open agreement to meet whenever the need for such meetings arises.

---Interview with Cairo OCTOBER chief editor, Anis Mansur; MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY, 23 April 1978 [Interview was published in OCTOBER on 23 April 1978]

[Question] In your speech to the U.S. National War College delegation, you announced that there have been no developments in the state of affairs between Egypt and Israel. You also failed to say what you expect to happen in the next few days. Does this mean that nothing has really changed?

[Answer] Actually nothing new has happened, although there are attempts to bring viewpoints closer. It is inappropriate to deal with these attempts because it is very easy for things to be misconstrued and to be exploited to the detriment of the exacting efforts being exerted to move peace forward. If there are differences or disputes or even attempts to fake disputes, then it is imperative for us not to be deceived by

what we perceive. We have learned a great deal about the tricks involved in politics and played by politicians. We have also learned a great deal from the verbal, oratory and parliamentary "traps." Therefore, we must view with caution everything we are being told and be cautious in all of our responses to everything the other side is doing. It is proper to give everything its opportune time so that things will clear up for us.

[Question] It has been reported that Moshe Dayan has offered to come to meet you. . . . What is the significance of Moshe Dayan's visit following the visit of 'Ezer Weizman? . . .

[Answer] The important thing is not the fact that Israeli officials should come one after the other. Contact already exists between us. I personally went to Jerusalem and Menahem Begin came to me. Therefore, direct contact is no longer the issue. What is important is that there be new ideas or new viewpoints worth presenting and worth being considered. . . . Therefore, it is now understood that if the other side has not arrived at any new ideas then such meetings, even if they are held, will be meaningless. . . .

[Question] There is a new theme in the Israeli. . . [and] Western information media [that] a separate solution is the only way left for Egypt and Israel. . . since Israel has not budged from its position. . . . According to this theme, if Egypt takes this move, the Arab states will follow its example and conclude agreements with Israel, thus solving the problem within a shorter period. What is the purpose of this campaign? . . .

[Answer] . . . The theme of a separate solution existed during the first and second disengagement agreements. It was decisively proven that there was no separate solution and no intention to conclude a separate solution. This is all well known, but people forget and leaders try to forget. Israel does not give up hope. It tries, it argues and it maneuvers.

I announced to the whole world in the Knesset: "I did not come to you in order to conclude a separate agreement between Egypt and Israel. This is not part of Egypt's policy. The problem is not between Egypt and Israel. Any separate peace between Egypt and Israel or between any confrontation state and Israel will not establish just and lasting peace in the whole area. Moreover, even if peace between all the confrontation states and Israel is achieved but no just

solution is found for the Palestinian problem, this will not result in the just and lasting peace which the whole world today wants to see achieved." . . .

When Begin came to Ismailia, the situation between us became even clearer--that is to say, the disagreement became clearer. There was no separate solution and there were no means for that. We stated then that the Israelis believe it is enough to grant autonomy to the Palestinians, while we believe that a Palestinian state must be established. This is still their position and our position, too. Therefore, there can be no separate solution between Egypt and Israel.

When I recalled the foreign minister from Jerusalem on 18 January, Egypt made a statement at the time saying that the foreign minister and his delegation had to withdraw from the talks so that the negotiations would not continue to move in a vicious circle and so that Israel would not seek secondary roads and move from one unsolved topic to another, not even on the agenda. The statement also said that Israel was still settling its account with the Arabs and with the entire world, and that this was not our concern. The fact that the Jews had been tortured and dispersed all over the world does not mean that there is any sense in the Palestinians' being dispersed under Israeli occupation as the price of Jewish suffering. The statement also noted that Israel preferred territory to security.

This means that Israel is still trying to buy security by occupying more territory of others or that it does not want security alone, but wants security and the territory of the others together. After all this, there is no further dispute or difference in points of view. There is no possibility of a separate solution because this has been totally rejected--before, during and after the initiative.

--Speech at May Day rally in Cairo on 2 May 1978; Cairo domestic service, 2 May 1978

The U.S. Government under the leadership of President Carter is now carrying out a historic role for the establishment of peace. Mr. Begin's last trip to the United States before the current one resulted in a clear and specific declaration of the main points of difference in principle between President Carter and Mr. Begin. You might have heard about the statements attributed to President Carter in the press yesterday and the fact that our foreign minister summoned and met with the U.S. ambassador, who notified us that the

position which President Carter adopted and on which he agreed with me during my visit to the United States has not changed.

President Carter announced an ethical political stand, which deserves out total appreciation, when he supported Resolution 242--which provides for withdrawal from all fronts in the occupied territory--and when he acknowledged the illegitimacy of the establishment of Israeli settlements in the occupied territory. This ethical and just political stand is not President Carter's alone. Many members of the U.S. Congress have adopted the same stand. U.S. public opinion, with all its powers in terms of decisionmaking, also adopted the same stand. Moreover, large numbers of American Jews, for the first time since the establishment of Israel, are adopting a similar position and do not want the historic peace opportunity to be missed. . . .

Some teenagers and those who bear grudges speak in the tone of a vain philosopher or claim to know all secrets and to say that the Egyptian initiative has blocked the way to the Geneva conference. I wonder when the road to the Geneva conference was open. /

Didn't the Syrian president tell the heads of the Gulf states, when he sought to instigate them against the initiative, that neither Syria nor the Soviet Union intended to attend the Geneva conference? . . . Were we not surprised at the maneuvers which took place regarding the Geneva conference working paper during the month-long talks which took place last summer among the Arab foreign ministers and the Israeli foreign minister with President Carter and Mr. Vance and between Washington and New York? All this resulted in a U.S. working paper, a U.S.-Israeli working paper and a U.S.-Soviet working paper. The road to the Geneva conference got lost among all these papers.

This prompted me to declare, in order to refute every maneuver, that Egypt is ready to go the the Geneva conference without any working paper. Egypt has never tried to evade attending the Geneva conference. Did we not call, and still call, for the Cairo conference in order to prepare for the Geneva conference? Weren't the talks in Ismailia and Jerusalem practical preparations for the Geneva conference?

We are not against the Geneva conference and we have never been opponents of the Geneva conference. However, convening the Geneva conference without comprehensive preparations and without a clear agreement on the principles of peace will cause us to go around in a vicious circle and the conference will be converted to form without substance, as has been the case of the Geneva disarmament conference for the past 25 years. . . . We will never give up the slogan of the total Arab right to complete withdrawal from the territories occupied since 1967 and the Palestinian people's right to self-determination and their right to establish their own state on their own land.

I am not at liberty, because of my position of responsibility, to disclose the purport of the current contacts until they have completed their course. As usual, I will place everything before you and the people. The last of these contacts was the arrival of U.S. Ambassador Atherton and the exchange of letters between me and President Carter. I would, however, like to reaffirm that President Carter's stand is principled, moral and straightforward.

We are not acting from a position of failure or lack of self-confidence. We receive any Israeli Government leader who wants to come. But we never deceive our people, because we immediately announce if there has been anything new prompting the resumption of direct talks with Israel. But their positions have not changed so far. . . . Our position has been and remains: Let the October war be the last war. . . . The whole world is now aware that the Sinai is not the reason for the peace crisis. The Israeli leaders are announcing daily that they have offered to withdraw from 99 percent of the Sinai, but first we demand the rights of the Palestinian people on their land before our rights on the land of Sinai. . . .

--Interview with New York TIMES' Anthony Lewis on 10 May 1978 in Mit Abu al-Kawm, Egypt; Cairo AL-AHRAM, 12 May 1978 [Interview was published in the New York TIMES on 11 May 1978]

In an important interview with the New York TIMES, President as-Sadat announced that Israel's desire to see the October war be the last one will not be achieved if it continues to be unyielding and does not share the responsibility for a peace settlement.

President as-Sadat said: "If Israel uses as an excuse the dangers of the creation of a Palestinian state, then it should return the West Bank to Jordan and the Gaza Strip to Egypt as temporary steps to a peace settlement in the area."

During his interview President as-Sadat posed the question: "If Israel continues to demand the preservation of the land, to expand and to steal part of our sovereignty by keeping the settlements in northeast Sinai, how can the October war be the last one?"

President as-Sadat criticized the recent statements made by Menahem Begin in the United States, including the speech in which he announced that his generation cannot and will not withdraw from the West Bank. When asked if a settlement can be attained on the basis of that, as-Sadat answered by saying: "Never, never." President as-Sadat said: "When Begin affirms that nothing can be achieved in the West Bank during this generation, a correct analysis of his words indicates that he does not want to achieve peace during this generation."

As-Sadat said that Begin's plan for self-rule for the Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza, which they will exercise through elected councils, aims in reality to give an air of legality to the Israeli occupation. The Begin plan aims at maintaining the Israeli military presence in these two areas under the excuses of security and for an indefinite period.

Concerning the question of whether agreement on the declaration of principles of a settlement would permit resumption of negotiations with Israel, the president replied: "We need a more comprehensive view."

Here as-Sadat introduced his personal idea of having Egypt and Jordan retrieve their control over the Gaza Strip and the West Bank within the framework of a temporary agreement. As-Sadat had said in the past that should the Palestinians and their state become a reality, it should be on the basis of a link with Jordan. As-Sadat repeated this once more, but he reaffirmed that this personal idea of having Jordan reassume control over the West Bank must not pose an obstacle within the framework of a settlement for the Palestinian problem after this transitional period. As-Sadat said that his country has no interest whatsoever in reassuming control over Gaza, but that "we only want to remove the present difficulties on the way to peace." When he was asked about Gaza President as-Sadat said that

he had met with representatives of the Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip and with Israel for the purpose of discussing the problems of security. He said: "I do not know if King Husayn is ready to do the same thing with respect to the West Bank."

Asked whether his patience has run out after six months of his initiative without any tangible progress, he said: "I have not yet reached this point because I am a patient man, not only patient but also optimistic." As-Sadat said that the Israeli prime minister will change his position because Begin, "according to what I see, cannot continue in his isolation from world public opinion for a long time. There is not in today's world, the world of the transistor, anyone who can isolate himself; therefore, the matter in the final analysis becomes one of time and nothing less."

--[The following report on as-Sadat's New York TIMES interview was published in the Cairo AL-JUMHURIYAH on 12 May 1978 as a REUTER-attributed item with a New York dateline.]

President as-Sadat has proposed the return of the Gaza Strip to Egypt and the occupied West Bank to Jordan as a preliminary step in the peace negotiations on the Middle East crisis.

President as-Sadat said in the TIMES interview that it was his intention to propose a return to the 1967 boundaries to prepare the way for Israeli Prime Minister Menahem Begin. The president added: "With the return to the 1967 boundaries, the West Bank will automatically be restored to Jordan and the Gaza Strip to Egypt. After that, let us sit down together to discuss other matters."

President as-Sadat said that it is impossible to ignore the Palestinians, because they are the essence and the heart of the matter. He explained that the return of the West Bank to Jordan does not mean the violation of the rights of the Palestinians. He declared his position of setting up a Palestinian state connected with Jordan. The president said that the most important consideration is that the Palestinians be enabled to determine their own future after five years. . . .

--Interview with the Chicago TRIBUNE on 13 May 1978; MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY, 15 May 1978

[Question] Mr. President, we are very much interested in the progress of the negotiations of peace and we saw the interview that you had given last week which suggested

to us possibly the stalemate is breaking up and that possibly you are starting some initiatives.

[Answer] Not yet, because, you see, we have to agree upon the fundamental issues so that you can find a common language to start with, but until this moment we did not find this common language or common ground, but apart from this, we are, as I said in my last speech, we are openminded, openhearted, and in my last speech also on the first of May I said let the October war be the last one, so this is our position now.

[Question] You did make a suggestion for the administration of the West Bank and the administration of Gaza Strip which seems to me as something of a new approach.

[Answer] Quite right. Well, I am always trying to find the ways and means to overcome the difficulties and to ease the whole thing, and for that I proposed my last proposals, which go really in harmony with the 242 Resolution. It will mean, that let us return to the positions before the 1967 war, namely the West Bank goes under Husayn and the Gaza Strip with Egypt, and let us sit together and discuss the security issue that we have already recognized.

[Question] Well, do you have any other proposals that you are likely to make in the next few days?

[Answer] For the time being I have nothing at all, but believe me all the time I am thinking and I mean doing my best really to try to find some way out of all this fuss.

[Question] We saw Ambassador Eilts on Wednesday [10 May] before he came out to see you. We knew your major statement and your suggestions on the same day and I wondered: Is there any possibility that you communicated with the ambassador about these proposals?

[Answer] No, no. Maybe I will tell you something. I may reveal something to you. I did not discuss this for sure. My friend President Carter received this for the first time from me, I mean from the New York TIMES. But the last time I met 'Ezer Weizman, the Israeli defense minister, I told him about this. . . .

[Question] Is there any real indication about how the Israeli Government is going to respond to your proposals?

[Answer] Not yet. Until this moment he did not send me his impression about the proposals, not yet.

[Question] Mr. President, we have a question here. You have called persistently for a general declaration of principles that will guide the negotiations for peace. Now you are proposing specific proposals for the control of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank?

[Answer] In fact it is one approach because, let me tell you, even the Israelis with their attitude now recognize that without solving the Palestinian question, which is the crux of the whole problem, there will be no peace in the area in spite of the fact that the Israelis would prefer to have a separate agreement with me. But they know and I told them quite frankly if the signature of a separate agreement brings peace to the area, permanent peace, that we are after now I am ready to do it. But it will not bring peace at all--either agreement with Egypt or agreements with all the confrontation states, namely Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt--by denying or not solving the Palestinian question, peace will not be established here. For the last two months or so we are trying to discuss the self-determination for the Palestinians and you know the Israeli position on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and the hard line they are adopting. This is a very important issue of security for Israel and so, very well, I am trying to facilitate the whole thing toward the establishment of peace.

I said we are not to return to the situation that was before 1967 but it differs completely now because in '67, at that time we refused to accept Israel in the area; we refused the direct negotiations with Israel in the area, and, automatically, we refused to be good neighbors because we did not accept them.

Now it is completely different. When we return to the situation of '67 it will be on the basis that we, as I have said, we accept Israel in the area. I myself have started the direct negotiations with them. We accept, as I have said before, whatever is in the dictionary under the word good neighborhood, we accept them without any conditions. So when I say let us return to the '67 [borders], they will go to the people and say this was insecure in position for Israel and so and so. This is completely different after my initiative. . . .

[Question] Is it possible that you might go to Jerusalem again for another conference in case the stalemate continues?

[Answer] As I have told you in my last speech on the first of May, this month, I said we are openhearted and openminded. The direct contact that I have already started will continue. Whatever develops, we shall be ready to answer. We shall be ready to seize so that we can reach an agreement, I am ready to go and sign it there but not before that. I have shown my will. But I have shown our good will, I mean, and our. . .

[Question] Good will?

[Answer] No, more than that. We have shown our will to take the most drastic decisions. I am ready to do it, but this time it should be the signature. . . .

Let me complete my last statement on this [U.S.] arms deal. . . . We are not asking for arms to attack Israel but for our legitimate defense issues, especially me in Africa here as I told you before. But I have stated before your congress and Senate that in the peace agreement I shall be ready to agree upon the limitation and ending the race of armament in the area. . . .

. . . We started this peace process immediately after the October war. Egypt and the United States, me and Kissinger, we started this peace process which achieved the first disengagement, the second disengagement agreement and then the third step toward the Geneva conference that Carter started to make the preparations for. Well, Henry at that time had a theory. He thought whenever he provides Israel with more arms and whenever they feel more secure through building a huge arsenal there in Israel, they will be more lenient and more ready to achieve peace. I was of the opposite opinion. I told him: No, it will not. On the contrary, it will make them at a certain point defy you and for that I am against any additional arms to Israel. . . .

[Question] Could you make the peace with Saudi Arabia and Jordan? You say you are reluctant to make unilateral peace with Israel. Would it be possible to make peace with these two partners?

[Answer] Well, mark this: The trip of the [Egyptian] vice president to Saudi Arabia is mainly for the [U.S.] arms deal. We are preparing ourselves to face the situation when you deny us, when your congress denies us very legitimate rights to defend our country and be provided with arms for our defense. So this is mainly in Saudi Arabia, but in Jordan it is completely different. Why? Because when I made my proposal that you have already told me about now, I did not know that when it was quoted in the New York TIMES that it was you

because as I told you, I told Weizman about it before, but I did not mention it [as received]. Well, because this issue, if agreed upon, will mean that Jordan should be ready to cooperate in the whole thing because they will be taking the West Bank again. The situation will return to 1967. Jordan will be in the West Bank, Egypt will be in Gaza Strip and then we sit together and discuss the security issue. And so I think it is quite logical that we should tell him what we mean by this. . . .

[Question] . . . Are you pessimistic about peace?

[Answer] Not at all. As I told you I am always optimistic by nature. I learned it here from this soil, where I was brought up. No, I am optimistic.

[Question] What can be done? What could the United States do?

[Answer] Quite simply, this: The United States could act as a full partner, not as a mediator or cochairman of the Geneva conference. Only it can guarantee Resolution 338 of the Security Council--the United States should act as full partner. That is what I want from the United States. From Israel, I am not asking for any concessions. I am telling them this: Let the October war be the last one and let us live in good neighborhood, and peace is the only means to provide security, not the expansion of lands.

[Question] Mr. President, you are satisfied that Mr. Carter has done a lot to persuade Israel to be more flexible?

[Answer] Not yet. I think not yet.

[Question] What additional steps would you like to see?

[Answer] You know, your administration headed by President Carter, they know the full details about the whole problem and all the dimensions of the whole thing. Peace built on justice, that is what we are seeking. Only peace based on justice and whatever this peace needs we are ready to provide. There are lots that President Carter should do and continue to do.

[Question] Could you suggest something specific that might be helpful from your point of view?

[Answer] Well, let me not embarrass him now and put only this quotation that he should act as a full partner, and because you know any disclosing of anything prematurely may damage the efforts that all of us are trying.

[Question] One of the strange things here is that you are asking him to act as a full partner to Egypt, I presume.

[Answer] Full partner to the problem, in the problem.

[Question] The United States is right in the middle of this. It is the arms supplier and chief negotiator for Israel as well as for Egypt, which makes it very difficult. How do you see a solution to that problem?

[Answer] When I say a full partner, Carter is not working as an agent for us. No. I say, Carter, we want his help in convincing people that peace should be built on justice. But I'm not asking President Carter to negotiate for me. I shall be negotiating. I have started direct negotiations in spite of the fact that, as I told you, for thirty years no one imagined it could have happened. I shall continue to have this direct contact. Needless to say, one of the conditions for the Arab solidarity that was sent to me is to break the direct negotiations with Israel. I said no. This is for you. This is for the first time I am saying this. Yes, I said no, I shall continue direct negotiations. Why? I don't want a guardian, either the United States or the Soviet Union. The time of guardianship here in Egypt has passed. We have our case in our hands. So, I'm not asking Carter to negotiate for me at all. But, whenever we sit together to negotiate, I'm asking Carter to act as a full partner not as a negotiator or as a mediator or just to convey messages from here to there or so. Around the table, he should be a full partner, and whatever he sees in the establishment of peace that is against justice, he must say it and declare before the whole world that this is against justice. That is what I mean.

[Question] You still maintain that the PLO forfeited its right to represent the Palestinians?

[Answer] I did not say this. I did not say this. I said that I do not have any connections now with the PLO because they have chosen to join the rejection camp. But whenever they choose to come and talk with my people here, they will be received by my foreign minister, by those who are responsible, or so. So this is our picture.

[Question] My question then was basically this: How does the PLO in your mind fit in your prospective settlement? It is very difficult for me to discern that.

[Answer] Well, Israel is not making it difficult only for the PLO. It is making it difficult for me, who has visited Jerusalem and jumped over a heritage of thousands of years. And they are doing the same with me.

[Question] I still do not understand how you think the PLO might be driven eventually to a peace agreement or resolution, given this kind of leadership.

[Answer] Well, as I told you, how can I answer such a question like this while I have the same thing from Israel, me, who have made the initiative and have faced the whole world?

[Question] You suggested that the United States become a full partner. Have you received any positive sign in recent weeks or recent days that they may indeed move for a good position and become a full partner around the table?

[Answer] . . . Let me hope that President Carter can fulfill this wish from our side. Until that moment I tell you this, lots can be done by President Carter but I am waiting.

[Question] Before we came over here, we met with Mr. Atherton and had a talk with him about the problems of the Middle East and he told us that time that things were at a stalemate and he did not know when things were going to begin to move again. Well, he made a speech--I think it was on Wednesday in Detroit in which he talked about the problem. And it seems to me that he was suggesting that maybe things were going on, that they showed a little movement again, that maybe the stalemate was breaking off a little and perhaps he was basing that on the interview that you had with the New York TIMES. I don't know. But, did you hear anything through Mr. Atherton that suggests that he thinks that movement is being made?

[Answer] Not yet. Not yet.

[Question] Mr. President, the Chicago TRIBUNE is carrying a story from its correspondent in Israel in tomorrow's newspaper that the government has begun seriously to consider several unofficial concessions to get the negotiations started again. One of them is the possibility of abolishing the military government on the West Bank and redetermining [as received] troops away from the population centers and strategic points along the river. Is that sort of thing what you are looking toward to get the negotiations started back again?

[Answer] Well, let me tell you this. We are after the evacuation of the land occupied in '67. If they are ready to evacuate the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, they are welcome, for sure. But it should not be taken as a concession, because they have not the right to continue the occupation there. They are not making any concessions.

[Question] Is there any way to get a peace settlement with Israel's settlements remaining in the occupied areas or do you call for strict civilian as well as military withdrawal from the area?

[Answer] Let me tell you this, our position on the settlements is that the settlements are illegal and this is your position also. This is Carter's position, and I cannot add anything to this. I don't know how they are going to establish permanent peace with us while they are occupying others' land or forcing settlements on others' land or so.

[Question] Even without a military presence?

[Answer] The settlements are illegal and what we are after is not the military presence or the military guardian of the settlements. No, the settlements in principle are illegal. . . .

--Remarks during meeting with Alexandria University professors on 28 May 1978 at President as-Sadat's retreat in al-Wanatir al-Khayriah; MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY, 28 May 1978

. . . Of course, our entire army is under arms and is deployed facing Israel. There is an agreement between me and Israel which will end in October--in four months. In the language of armies I must be vigilant a year before the agreement ends. Four months from now--in October--the second disengagement agreement between us and Israel will end. God only knows [what will happen then], because the behavior of the Israeli Government is not clear, though our behavior is clear. We are saying that we are ready with open minds and hearts. We are saying: Let the October war be the last war. However, we must be vigilant. . . .

--Remarks at press conference with foreign journalists on 30 May 1978 at al-Wanatir al-Khayriah; MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY, 30 May 1978

[Question] Wilton Winn of TIME magazine: Mr. President, I am sure that you are aware that your critics have enjoyed very much recently claiming that your peace initiative has failed. I wonder if you can tell us your estimate at this moment where the peace initiative stands and if you can project a little into the future as to what you think will be the next steps.

[Answer] I must tell you something before I answer what our friend Winn has asked. I read your article in TIME. I do not agree with you that due to the stalemate of the initiative,

I must take any measure. . . . If the initiative proved to be a complete failure, is this a reason that I start acting haphazardly? No, it will not be the end of the world, even if the initiative proves at the end to be a complete failure. . . . I am optimistic, and I shall continue, because I shall say, well, this is not the end of the world. Let us try another way, let us try another language, another system or so. . . .

The second part of the question, Winn, is where are we now in the initiative? I must tell you this, the momentum of the peace process now is slackening. It has not stopped. Approximately daily we have an exchange of views, approximately daily. The American ambassador left last week with a complete survey on my side to be put before President Carter.

The Israelis' position is still in stagnation, like it was before. But let me tell you this, whenever there are new elements from the Israeli side, Egypt, as I said before on the first of May, Egypt will be openhearted and openminded to receive these new elements and start direct negotiations. Not before that.

If there are new elements and for sure they can give new elements, for sure there will be new elements from our side.

This is the true situation. It is a stalemate to a certain extent. But let me tell you, inform you, the peace process has not frozen yet. It is going on but in very slow motion, like some of the movies which want to show some action so it is in slow motion. It did not freeze and we are ready, openhearted, openminded, for any new elements from the Israeli side and there will be reciprocation. . . .

Without solving the Palestinian question, we cannot establish permanent peace in the area. And we should not decide the future of the Palestinians behind their back. They should join in determining their future. This is the Egyptian position.

[Question] Vice President Husni Mubarak was in Jordan after your declaration of the possibility, as a kind of interim solution, to accept the return of the Gaza Strip to Egyptian authority and the West Bank to Jordanian authority. What was the response of King Husayn to this idea?

[Answer] Well, I should prefer the question to be asked of King Husayn. . . I don't want to embarrass him, and you

know, when I made my initiative, really, I did not contact any Arab leader, because I said this is my responsibility and I do not want to embarrass anybody. But King Husayn has understood the spirit behind this initiative. And let me hope that at the proper moment he will declare his position on this. But I must say this before you as representatives of the foreign press: Whenever King Husayn agrees to this, it will not be against the Rabat strategy, because in the Rabat strategy and in item number one, we say that all the Arab lands occupied after '67 should be returned or should be evacuated by the Israelis. So it is quite natural, and I made this initiative as one alternative from the alternatives we are trying always to put so that we can achieve peace. . . .

[Question] Mr. President, do you think that we'll have an Arab summit very soon?

[Answer] I don't know. If you ask my opinion, as I told you, my position, as I told President Numayri and King Khalid about it, is that we have no objection. But if you ask for my opinion, I should like it to take place after two months, after the stalemate and the stagnation in which the situation of the Arab-Israeli conflict now is suffering ends, because I think in two months we shall reach a result. Either the peace process gains momentum again or it proves to be a failure. . . .

[Question] Mr. President, do you feel that it is now up to the United States, to President Carter, to make some major new move now to get the peace talks going again?

[Answer] As I told you, I am in constant contact with President Carter. The last time I visited the United States, I stated my position before the American people and asked President Carter, the Senate, the Congress to take their share as full partners in the dispute between us and Israel. I am waiting for this moment that the United States takes its full share as a full partner so that we can give new momentum to the peace process.

[Question] So, so far then, you say the United States is not a full partner?

[Answer] Not yet, until this moment, not yet.

[Question] If nothing has happened six months from now, will your peace initiative still be alive?

[Answer] Let me tell you in all frankness, my peace initiative will never die. It is now in the heart of every peace-loving man or woman. . . . I tell you I am not worrying myself about the next six months. I shall be waiting, like the British say, until I reach the bridge and then I shall cross it. . . .

[Question] Would it be correct for us to conclude that you will decide the future of your peace initiative and that this will require a decision before October--that is to say, within the next two months you mentioned?

[Answer] Well, let me be clear on this. I did say that if I were personally asked about convening an Arab summit conference, I would suggest after two months or so and not before. But as for the question you raised now regarding the extension of the mandate of the UN forces in October, it is not just a matter of renewing or not renewing the mandate of the UN forces. It is much deeper than that. The second disengagement of forces agreement between me and Israel will expire in October. Do you understand? This is much deeper than the term of the UN forces mandate and I described it as tantamount to a big test. . . .

[Question] The new Israeli President, Mr. Navan, yesterday made an urgent appeal to you to start the negotiations process again, and to be ready for negotiations again. Do you have any signs from the Israeli side, and what is your answer to the Israeli President?

[Answer] The answer is that we are ready, openhearted, openminded for the establishment of peace and good neighborhood. And the security of Israel. But we are not ready to give up any part of our land. This is my answer. Well, there is an indication from the side of Israel that the Israeli situation has changed. And as I said before, we shall be ready when they, the Israeli situation changes. When a new element appears, we shall be ready, openhearted, openminded, to conduct direct efforts to establish peace. . . .